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Summary 
 
This article deals with the question whether we need to speed up social convergence in the enlarged 
EU by setting common standards for social benefit levels. We conclude that the case for such a 
harmonization is not strong. Analysing several indicators, we show that there are no clear signs of a 
social race to the bottom yet. And we do not expect this to happen as a consequence of the 
enlargement either. Once economic convergence will materialise, the new member states should also 
be able to converge to higher protection levels.  
However, we do acknowledge the importance of the social dimension of the integration process and 
argue that the currently used method of open coordination in the social domain should be 
strengthened, in order to face the common challenge to reform the social system. Not more, but more 
effective coordination is needed. 
 
 
Samenvatting 
 
In dit artikel staat de vraag centraal of in het licht van de EU-uitbreiding een sterkere coördinatie van 
het socialezekerheidsbeleid gewenst is, bijvoorbeeld door het vaststellen van minimumnormen voor 
sociale uitkeringen. We concluderen dat er geen sterke argumenten zijn voor een dergelijke 
harmonisatie. Aan de hand van verschillende indicatoren laten we zien dat er tot dusverre geen 
duidelijke tekenen van sociale dumping zijn. En we verwachten ook niet dat de uitbreiding een 
dergelijk effect zal hebben. Als de nieuwe lidstaten een economische inhaalslag kunnen maken zullen 
ze ook in staat zijn hun beschermingsniveau’s te verbeteren.  
Wij onderschrijven echter wel het belang van de sociale dimensie in het integratieproces en bepleiten 
een versterking van de open coördinatiemethode, met het oog op de gemeenschappelijke uitdaging om 
het sociale stelsel te hervormen. Niet meer, maar meer effectieve coördinatie is vereist. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The various national systems of social protection are deeply rooted in the member states of 
the European Union (EU). The principles and organisation of social security are national 
responsibilities. Yet, the social dimension has been accorded its own place in the European 
integration process. Social convergence within the EU has since long been an important goal. 
A new and important step was taken with the adoption of the strategic Lisbon Agenda in the 
year 2000, which explicitly coupled the economic objective of becoming the most 
competitive and dynamic economy with the social objective of greater social cohesion. This 
is a major challenge, even more so in the enlarged EU, and requires modernisation of the 
European welfare states. When the Constitution is accepted, social protection and social 
cohesion will also become constitutional goals of the EU.  
The open method of coordination is applied to social policy. This means that the member 
states define and evaluate common objectives. These objectives refer to employment, social 
inclusion and pension reform. This method is based on benchmarking and peer pressure, but 
does not offer the possibility of sanctions. The EU does not prescibe how to achieve these 
objectives. This remains in the realm of national sovereignty, under the principle of 
subsidiarity. That principle means that decisionmaking takes place at the lowest level of 
government, appropriate for the particular issue in question.  But what level of government is 
appropriate for social policy? Or, in other words, do we need more coordination of social 
protection policies? This is the central question of this article. We address this question 
especially in the context of the enlargement. Should the enlarged EU try to speed up 
convergence by setting common standards? This question will be dealt with both from a 
theoretical and from an empirical point of view. 
Theoretically, there can be a ground for coordination or even harmonisation if there are 
failures of decentralisation, such as international spillovers or externalities and economies of 
scale. These failures should outweigh the benefits of decentralisation, such as diversity in 
preferences and accountability. As far as social policy is concerned, the main argument in 
favour of more coordination is the existence of externalities. Labour and capital mobility in a 
fully integrated economic space may lead to forms of competition, which could result in 
lower protection levels; the well known ‘race to the bottom argument’. Because of the 
dangers of ‘social dumping’ and ‘benefit tourism’ it has often been proposed to introduce 
European minimum social standards, such as minimum benefit levels (Hutsebaut 2003). 
However, others argue that there are no clear signs that a race to the bottom actually takes 
place. Also, the costs of premature harmonization can be very high (Sinn and Ochel 2003).  
After briefly discussing the history of Social Europe in section 2, we will deal in section 3 
with the theoretical discussion on the coordination of social policy. In section 4 we present 
empirical evidence on the race to the bottom argument. It appears that during the last 
decades, social protection levels have in fact converged to a common higher level. In section 
5 we discuss the impact of the enlargement on social policies. Do lower protection levels give 
the new member states a competitive advantage? And are the social systems in the old 
member states threatened by this? Finally, in section 6 we draw some conclusions. We argue 
that the open method of coordination provides a good balance between subsidiarity on the 
one hand and the – supposed – need for a stronger European social policy on the other hand. 
However, to be effective, this method and its implementation should be strengthened.          
 
 
SOCIAL EUROPE 
 
From Rome to Lisbon 
Already the founding fathers of the EEC acknowledged the importance of the social 
dimension of the European integration process. However, they expected social progress to 
result from economic integration. Partly as a result thereof, the European Treaty of 1957 only 
offers a legal basis for harmonization of social policies in relation to the free movement of 
labour. Regulations concerning the social protection of migrant workers have been accepted 
as early as 1957. The most important regulation in this field, 1408/71 (recently replaced by 
regulation 883/2004), on the coordination of social security systems relating to migrant 
workers, was passed after the free movement of workers was fully realized at the end of the 
1960s.  As Leibfried and Pierson (1996) note, this regulation has, together with the 
accompanying case law of the Court, restricted the sovereignty of member states in social 
policy1. Yet, the emphasis is clearly on coordination instead of harmonization of social 
policy. Reconsideration (4) of regulation 883/2004 now explicitly states the necessity to 
respect the special characteristics of national social security legislation and to draw up only a 
system of coordination.  
 
In the 1970s EU directives were introduced on equal treatment between men and women and 
on safety and health regulations. The social protection systems, however, remained, with the    
exception of the issues involving the social protection of migrant workers, in the realm of 
national sovereignty. This has not changed since then. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and 
the inclusion of the Social Protocol into the basic Treaty were a step forward in the social 
domain in general, but provide no basis for involvement of the EU with social protection 
levels in the member states.  
Still, member states have accepted a certain degree of commitment in terms of social 
protection. This commitment is embodied in two recommendations accepted by the European 
Council in 1992. The first recommendation, of June 1992, dealt with common criteria 
concerning sufficient resources and social assistance in social protection systems 
(92/441/EEC). The second recommendation, of July 1992, explicitly addressed the 
“convergence of social protection objectives and policies” (92/442/EEC). The motivation was 
that convergence seeks to guarantee the continuation and stimulate the development of social 
protection within the context of the completion of the internal market. And also that member 
states face common problems, such as ageing of the population, unemployment, changing 
family structures and poverty; common objectives must act as pointers to the way social 
protection systems are modified to take account of these problems. The recommendation 
further stipulates broadly defined goals, but “without prejudice to the powers of the member 
states to establish the principles and organisation of their systems”. Finally, the monitoring is 
recommended of the progress achieved in relation to the convergence of social protection 
aims and policies across the Union. 
The desirability of convergence of member states' policies has been reconfirmed in several 
reports of the European Commission, such as the White Paper on European Social Policy of 
1994 and reports on Social Protection in Europe. The 1998 Employment Guidelines, as a 
result of the Jobs Summit in Luxembourg at the end of 1997, can partly be seen as an 
implementation of the convergence strategy. A main line of action in these guidelines is to 
improve the employability of those out of work. This reflects a change in orientation of 
systems of social protection: a shift towards a more active policy designed to get people into 
employment rather than merely transferring income to those who are out of work. Though 
crucial in modernising social protection, this change in orientation does not have implications 
for benefit levels, coverage and eligibility criteria, i.e. for the scope and generosity of national 
systems. 
A new and important step was taken at the European Council in Lisbon 2000. For the EU the 
strategic goal was set for the decade ending in 2010: to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy with sustainable economic growth and greater social 
cohesion. The economic and social agendas were thus explicitly coupled. To achieve these 
aims, the social model needs to be modernised. To ensure long-term sustainability of the 
social security systems in the light of the ageing process, participation rates should be 
increased.  
 
The method of open coordination 
The Treaty of Nice took the social agenda forward. It was agreed to advance social policy on 
the basis of the method of open coordination (OMC). The OMC was first employed with 
respect to employment policies in the EU, but as far as social policy is concerned, the 
foundations were already laid in the recommendation of July 1992. The method recognizes 
that social policy remains the responsibility of member states, under the principle of 
subsidiarity. It implies that member states define and evaluate common objectives and learn 
from each other how to best reach these objectives. Best practices are disseminated and 
benchmarking is used. Coordination is based on evaluation and peer pressure, but does not 
offer the option of sanctions. In Nice it was decided that member states should implement 
action plans for combatting poverty and social exclusion and to define common objectives on 
social indicators. The indicators encompass financial poverty, income inequality, long-term 
unemployment, regional variation in employment rates, life expectancy and poor health.  
Some consider these common indicators and the national action plans for social inclusion as 
significant progress towards integration along the social dimension (Atkinson 2002). Others 
question this form of coordination. De Mooij and Tang  (2003) argue that the lack of binding 
agreements may also render coordination of social policy ineffective, in which case fears for 
social dumping may again lead to calls for harmonization.  
 
Three forms of coordination of social policy in the EU 
The developments summarized above have resulted in three forms of policy-coordination in 
the social field: 
- Coordination of social protection systems with respect to migrant workers, retired 
workers, their family members and students (regulation 1408/71 and its case law). 
- Minimum harmonization with regard to certain aspects of working conditions. Although 
article 137 Treaty of the European Communities (TEC), which provides the legal basis 
for minimum harmonization, also covers social security and social protection of workers, 
secondary legislation relating to minimum harmonization of social protection does not 
exists. On this aspect of article 137, decision-making is by unanimity.    
- Open coordination with respect to social inclusion, modernization of pension systems 
and, as proposed by the Commission, also on health care systems.           
 
PROS AND CONS OF COORDINATION 
 
In this section we will discuss the economic literature on the impact of economic integration 
on social protection levels. Do externalities provide ground for centralisation of social 
protection policies? 
 
Effects of economic integration 
Theoretically, economic integration can be both beneficial and harmful to social protection 
systems. According to a well-known argument economic development undermines traditional 
solidarities in family and local structures (Chassard and Quintin, 1993). And increased labour 
mobility also creates a need for employment-related insurances and for broader networks of 
solidarity. At the same time, higher levels of income also offer the possibility to develop a 
system of social security with adequate protection levels. At least the funding of such a 
system will become easier. So, according to this line of reasoning, economic development 
strengthens the need for an extended system of social protection as well as the opportunity to 
fund it. And, to the extent that European integration promotes economic development by 
reducing uncertainty, lowering risk premiums and improving investment opportunities, it may 
therefore contribute to the expansion of such systems. Intensified contacts between countries 
may promote convergence of policies as well. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that economic integration may be harmful to national 
social security schemes. First, economic integration and a well-functioning internal market 
may stimulate migration. Migration as a result of relative price signals is economically 
efficient. A different situation arises however, when migration flows are provoked by 
differences in levels of social protection. In that case an adverse selection problem occurs: 
individuals who expect to be net beneficiaries will be attracted to countries with generous 
social programs, while net contributors are deterred by the high tax burden in these countries. 
Consequently, the social protection systems there are confronted with increasing outlays as 
well as a narrowing financial base which will ultimately result in lower protection levels 
(Sandmo 2001). This is a standard argument for centralising redistribution policies in an 
economic union, although it can be shown that centralisation is not an inevitable consequence 
(Wildasin, 1991) and measures can be taken to limit and perhaps even eliminate the problem 
in practice. 
Another problem may occur when lower levels of social protection translate into lower labour 
costs. In that case economic integration and higher transparency can damage the competitive 
position of countries with relatively generous protection systems vis-à-vis other countries. 
The former may react by lowering protection levels and, thus, set into motion a 'race to the 
bottom'. In the end social protection may indeed converge, but only at a very low level of 
protection. This is usually called the 'social dumping' or 'wage dumping' argument (Sinn 
2003: 89). A more neutral term is ‘policy competition’.  
 
Both views on the effect of economic integration on social protection are echoed in article 
136 TEC, which states the objectives of European social policies. According to this article, 
the objectives of improvement and convergence of living and working conditions and proper 
social protection will not only ensue from the functioning of the common market, which will 
favour the harmonization of social systems, but also from minimum requirements for gradual 
implementation (as stated in Article 137(2) TEC). Of course, the adaptation of EU minimum 
requirements is subject to the subsidiarity principle. This means that the Community only can 
take action when, by reason of  scale or the effects of the proposed action, the objectives 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member states. 'The effects of the proposed action' 
refer to potential external effects, which in this case could either arise because of social 
security migration or competition effects.  
 
A closer look at the policy competition argument 
The possible effects of social security tourism on social protection systems are hardly 
disputed in the literature. The main point here is whether this poses major problems in 
practice for member states. We will deal with this question in section 5. The social-dumping 
or competition argument is more disputed, both theoretically and empirically. We discern 
three themes in the literature: 
- Tax incidence: does social expenditure increase total wage costs or does it mainly affect 
the composition of total wage costs? 
- Competitiveness: does the welfare state poses a threat to competitiveness?  
- Spontaneous convergence: are low standards, as argued by Sinn (2003), a necessary 
concomitant of a long adjustment process and will countries with lower social standards 
ultimately catch-up with countries with higher standards? Sinn argues that a premature 
harmonization would delay the catch-up process, resulting in large migration from new 
members states to old member states. According to him, these migration streams would, 
in turn, put pressure on social expenditure in old member states.    
 
In the remainder of this section we will briefly discuss the first two points. The third theme –  
spontaneous convergence – will be more extensively dealt with in the next section.  
 
Tax incidence 
Although employers usually pay part of social security contributions, it is not self-evident 
that these contributions automatically contribute to higher nominal wage costs. The degree to 
which social expenditure contributions will result in higher wage costs will generally depend 
on three factors (see OECD 1990; Alogoskoufis et al, 1995; Alesina and Perotti 1997): 
- The elasticities of the labour demand and labour supply curves. If the labour supply curve is 
highly inelastic – labour supply hardly reacts to changes in wages – and labour demand 
elasticity is within a normal range – than contributions will mainly affect the composition of 
wage costs and not result in higher wage costs. In this case employers will be able to 
ultimately shift their contributions to employees by offering lower wages.  
- The degree to which employees see contributions as insurance premiums instead of a tax on 
wages. This will determine the incentive to change employment behavior as reaction to 
higher contributions and the degree of tax shifting. 
- The behavior of trade unions. In the presence of trade unions, social contributions will be 
borne in part by employers and will therefore increase labour costs even if the individual 
labour supply is perfectly inelastic. However, centralized, encompassing trade unions will 
internalize the resulting adverse consequences of higher wage costs on employment and 
consequently moderate wage claims.    
 
Because of differences in short-run and long-run elasticities, differences in trade-union 
behavior, and possible differences in the appreciation by employees of social protection, it is 
hardly surprising that the empirical studies do not give an univocal answer to the question 
whether higher contributions result in higher labor costs. The OECD Jobs Study (OECD 
1995: 247) concludes on the basis of several studies that increases in taxation are often – but 
not universally – found to affect real wage costs. However, differential responses for different 
taxes should be interpreted with caution.  Nickell (2003) concludes in his recent survey of the 
matter that there is probably some adverse long-run tax effect on labour costs. Note, however, 
that even if this effect would be substantial (which is not obvious), this does not necessarily 
mean that increased policy competition will put a downward pressure on social expenditure. 
It does imply that increased policy competition may force employees to pay a bigger part of 
social expenditure and shift less to employers. Seen in this perspective, policy competition 
will mainly have distributional consequences.       
 
Competitiveness 
Recently a number of studies have asked whether welfare states can survive globalization. 
They investigate the relation between the degree of openess of economies, competitiveness, 
and the level of social expenditure (Rodrik 1998; Agell 1999, Krueger 2000, De Grauwe and 
Pollan 2003). Perhaps surprisingly, these studies typically find a positive relation between the 
degree of openness and the level of social expenditures. It thus appears that countries which 
are more prone to external competitive pressures have on average higher expenditure ratios. 
There are a number of possible explanations for a positive relationship between openness and 
social expenditure ratios: 
- Open economies are usually small economies with centralized, encompassing unions which 
internalize possible adverse effects of social expenditure on labor costs and competitiveness.  
- Open economies are generally rich. Richer countries can afford to spend more on social 
programs. Moreover, social expenditure may be considered as a ‘luxury good’ with an 
income elasticity greater than one. This will cause social expenditure to rise proportionally 
faster than income (see next section).     
- Because open economies are more prone to the ups and downs of the world market, the 
demand for social protection will be bigger in these economies. 
- Adequate social protection may foster risk taking, which may stimulate productivity and 
competitiveness.   
 
This is not the place to discuss which explanation is best. Moreover, they are not mutually 
exclusive. The point we want to make is that both the literature on tax incidence and the 
relation between openness and social expenditure ratios raises serious doubts about the 
premises of the policy-competition argument.  
 
 
SOCIAL CONVERGENCE? 
 
The evidence surveyed above raises doubts about the validity of the policy-competition 
argument. Further evidence can be gained by looking more directly at the developments over 
time of social expenditure and replacement rates. Is there spontaneous convergence? If so, is 
it towards a high or low level? What are possible explanations?  
 
Tests on convergence 
Have social protection systems converged under the influence of economic integration?  
Cornelisse and Goudswaard (2002) have analysed whether social protection systems actually 
have converged or diverged during the past decades. To that end, they used data on gross 
replacement rates of unemployment benefits and data on the share of GDP spent on social 
benefits. The social security expenditure ratio gives an indication of the financial effort to 
provide social protection, while replacement rates are a measure of the level of benefits and 
thus of the generosity of the welfare programs. A test on convergence was carried out using 
the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation as yardsticks. They apply the term 
relative convergence (divergence) when observing a drop (rise) in the value of the coefficient 
of variation and the term absolute convergence (divergence) when using the standard 
deviation as criterion
2
. For the EU countries Cornelisse and Goudswaard find both a relative 
and an absolute convergence of replacement rates during the last decades. The coefficient of 
variation dropped by one third since 1980. Social expenditure ratios showed a rather strong 
relative convergence (the cooefficient of variation fell by some 30 percent since 1980), 
especially in EU countries (the present member states), but also in non-EU OECD countries. 
However, the EU countries did not show absolute convergence (the standard deviation hardly 
changed during the period of observation). In other words, the relative convergence they 
observe is the result of the rise in the average value of the expenditure ratio.  
Table 1, which is based on the most recent Eurostat data, also indicates a strong convergence 
of social protection expenditure, both relatively and absolutely. Between 1980 and 2001 the 
standard deviation of social expenditure declined by 60%, while the coefficient of variantion 
showed a decrease by 59%. Especially the Mediterranean countries, with rather low levels of 
protection in 1980,  catched up rapidly in terms of social expenditure. This largely explains 
the rather strong social convergence.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1  Expenditure on social protection* as % of GDP (EU-15) 
 
 1980 1990 2001 
 
    
Austria 22.4 26.7 28.4 
Belgium 28.0 26.4 27.5 
Denmark 28.7 28.7 29.5 
Finland 18.6 25.1 25.8 
France 25.4 27.9 30.0 
Germany 28.8 25.4 29.8 
Greece 9.7 22.9 27.2 
Ireland 20.6 18.4 14.6 
Italy 19.4 24.7 25.6 
Luxembourg 26.5 22.1 21.2 
Netherlands 30.1 32.5 27.6 
Portugal 12.9 15.2 23.9 
Spain 18.2 19.9 20.1 
Sweden 32.0 33.1 31.3 
United Kingdom 21.5 23.0 27.2 
    
Average 22.9 24.8 26.0 
Standarddeviation  3.75 2.00 1.55 
Coefficient of variation 0.25 0.13 0.10 
 
*Including benefits for the following functions: sickness, health care, invalidity, disability, old age, survivors, 
maternity, family, vocational guidance, unemployement, housing, miscellaneous. 
Source: Social Protection in Europe, Eurostat.  
 
 
Dekker et al (2004) estimate β-convergence of social expenditure. This is done by regressing 
the growth of social expenditure on the initial level of expenditure. They find a β-convergence of 
4% per year during the period 1980-1998. This means that the difference of a country with 
respect to the EU-average declines by 4% per year.  
But what about the indicators used? These have several limitations. It is well known that 
statistics on social expenditures and benefits are difficult to compare across countries. 
Countries use different definitions of social security and social protection. Perhaps the most 
important problems are related to differences in the public/private mix in the provision of 
social protection and differences in tax systems.  
 
Adjusted indicators 
The OECD has developed indicators that aim to measure what governments really devote to 
social  spending, net public social expenditure, and what part of an economy’s domestic 
production recipients of social benefits draw on, net total social expenditure (Adema 2001). 
Benefits may be provided by either public institutions or market institutions. In the latter case, 
market provision may be regulated by government in such a way as to make it equivalent to 
public provision. These different forms of social protection are not included consistently in 
national statistics. A specific statistical problem is related to the tax treatment of social benefits. 
In some countries benefits are taxable as a rule, in others not.  Also, benefits can take the form 
of tax relief, for example a tax deduction for children. 
Table 2 presents figures on the net social expenditure as percentage of GDP for 1997, for the 
EU-countries for which these data are available.  
 
Table 2  Net social expenditure (% GDP), 1997 (ranked according net social expenditure) 
 
 
 
Gross public social 
expenditure 
 
Gross total social 
expenditure 
 
Net total social 
Expenditure 
 
    
Sweden 31.8 34.8 27.3 
Germany 26.4 28.6 26.1 
Belgium 27.2 29.5 25.4 
Denmark 30.7 32.0 23.5 
Italy 26.4 27.8 22.7 
Finland 28.7 30.0 22.1 
Austria 25.4 27.0 22.0 
United Kingdom 21.2 24.9 21.8 
Netherlands 24.2 29.1 21.5 
Ireland 17.6 19.2 16.5 
    
Average 26.0 28.2 22.8 
Coefficient of variation 0.15 0.14 0.13 
Standard deviation 4.02 3.98 2.88 
 
source: Adema (2001); Goudswaard and Caminada (2003) 
 
The data clearly indicate that these adjustments have an equalising effect on levels of social effort 
across countries. Both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation show a decline.  
 
Table 3 presents a comparison of the countries for which information is available on net replacement 
rates of unemployment benefits.
3
 Only the first period of unemployment is considered (social 
assistance included). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3  Gross and net replacement rates unemployment benefits (in %), 1999 
 
 Index gross  
replacement  
rates 
 
Index net  
Replacement  
Rates 
 
   
Austria 41.7 69.5 
Belgium 45.7 72.4 
Czech Republic 22.0 66.8 
Denmark 66.0 80.8 
Finland 54.0 81.0 
France 59.0 75.3 
Germany 37.0 67.5 
Greece 41.3 47.1 
Hungary 50.0 62.3 
Ireland 35.0 51.4 
Italy 60.0 45.5 
Luxembourg 80.0 84.5 
Netherlands 70.7 84.8 
Poland 29.0 51.5 
Portugal 65.0 83.0 
Slovak Republic 40.0 77.8 
Spain 63.0 74.8 
Sweden 74.0 81.5 
United Kingdom 17.3 53.6 
   
Average EU 15 54.1 72.1 
Coefficient of variation 0.32 0.17 
Standard deviation 17.2 12.3 
 
 
Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages, OECD Indicators, 2002; Goudswaard and Caminada (2003) 
  
Net adjusted replacement rates appear to be much higher than gross rates. Again, we 
calculated the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation. The coefficient of variation 
drops by 47 percent, while the standard deviation drops by 27 percent.  
To conclude, this analysis indicates that accounting for private social benefits and for the 
impact of the tax system indeed has an equalising effect on levels of social effort across 
member states. Unfortunately, there are no time-series of the adjusted figures of social 
protection. But the fact that differences in (adjusted) protection levels have become that small 
suggests that convergence of social protection may even have been stronger than measured 
by earlier studies. 
 
How to explain convergence? 
In his recent book on the development of social spending and economic growth, Lindert 
summarizes five leading forces which help to explain the rise of social expenditure as well as 
cross-country differences in that rise (Lindert 2004: 188): democratization, the aging of 
populations, globalization, the rise of income per capita, and international differences in the 
social affinities felt by middle-income voters. To explain the convergence of social 
expenditure ratios in EU- member states, the first four factors seem to be relevant. With 
respect to the first factor one can point at the transition to democracy that Spain, Portugal and 
Greece underwent from the mid seventies onwards. Governments not only needed to stabilize 
the countries politically but also respond to new and pressing social needs that were brought 
about by the coincidence of political transitions to democracy and economic crisis (Castles 
1995; Guillén and Alvarez 2000). Together with the aging of the population and the rise of 
income per capita this probably explains most of the rise of social expenditure ratios in these 
countries, and consequently the convergence of social expenditure ratios within the EU-15 
(see table 1 above).  
Scharpf (1999: 177) observes a strong correlation between gdp per capita and social 
expenditure ratios in the EU. He notes that the member states are remarkably alike in their 
revealed preference for social spending. By and large, the richer member states have 
proportionally larger public social expenditure than less rich countries. It seems that past 
patterns of overall social spending can largely be explained by changes in the ability to pay. 
As Scharpf observes, this is by no means a trivial explanation, since it does not hold for the 
total set of industrialised OECD-countries.  
 
We have done a simple regression analysis with an update of Scharpf’s data for 2000, and 
included new member states.  Figure 1 shows the result.      
Excluding the two outliers Ireland and Luxemburg from the sample, the strong correlation 
between gdp per capita and social expenditure ratios noted by Scharpf is confirmed (R2 = 
0,65)
4. The extreme position of Ireland is mainly explained by its relatively young population. 
Ireland is the only country in the sample where pension payments do not constitute the 
biggest part of social spending. The next section will focus on the position of the new 
member states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1 Social expenditure ratios and gdp per capita (2000).   
Sources: Social expenditure ratios EU-15: Eurostat, European Social Statistics, Social Protection, 
Expenditure and receipts data 1991-2003, Luxemburg 2003, p.14 (compare table 1); New member 
states: Gesellschaft für Versicheringswissenschaft und -gestaltung, Study on the Social Protection 
Systems in the 13 Applicant Countries, november 2002 , p. 22; gdp/capita: EU-15: Europese 
Commissie, The EU Economy 2002, op.cit., pp. 286-287; New member states: Eurostat, Towards an 
Enlarged European Union, Key indicators on Member states and Candidate Countries.    
 
  
NEW MEMBER STATES 
 
In most of the new member states social expenditure ratios are lower than in most of the old 
member states. Does this gives new member states a competitive advantage? And will this set 
into motion  a 'race to the bottom' (e.g. Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). Moreover, are social 
protection systems in old member states threatened by migration from new member states? 
Or will social expenditure ratios in new member states catch-up with the levels in old 
member states?  
 
Social expenditure ratios 
The average social expenditure ratio in the new member states is seven percentage points 
below the average for old member states. However, as figure 1 shows, there is considerable 
variation within the new member states. The Polish expenditure ratio is almost 9 percentage 
points higher than the Estonian ratio. In fact, Polish, Hungarian and Slovenian expenditure 
ratios are near the EU-15-average, and for example well above the Irish ratio. This is quite 
remarkable given the much lower GDP per capita in these countries. As figure 1 shows, there 
is a rather strong relation between GDP per capita and social expenditure ratio in the enlarged 
EU. The fit of the trend line even improves when new member states are included in the 
sample. Seen in this perspective, social expenditure ratios in new member states are in line 
with their income levels and in some countries like Poland even well above their income 
level. (see Lindert 2004: 216-217).  
Note also that table 3 in section 4 shows that adjusted net replacement rates of unemployment 
benefits in the new member states do not differ very much from those in the EU-15 countries. 
 
Pension reform in new member states: a case of 'social dumping'?  
The main reason why social expenditures in Poland, Hungary and Slovenia are relatively high 
has to do with their pension systems. For example, pension expenditure in Poland is over 
14% of gdp. Compared to the age structure of the population, these countries have relatively 
high numbers of pensioners. The easy access to pension benefits arose in three ways (see Barr 
2001: 252). First, the general retirement age under communism was low. Second, for some 
privileged groups like miners the retirement age was very low. Third, during the transition 
period in the 1990s, generous early retirement has been frequently used as an exit route from 
the labour force. As a result, employment ratios in general and for older workers in particular, 
are well below the figures for old member states (see table 4). 
 
Table 4 – Employment ratios and unemployment rates in new member states , 2001 
(percentages) 
 
Employment ratio  
Total Females Age 55-59  Age 60-64  
Unemployment 
Rate 
Cyprus 65.5 52.5 60.5 35.1   4.5 
Czech Repu. 64.9 56.8 50.2 16.9  n.b. 
Estonia 60.6 57.1 58.4 29.4 12.3 
Hungary 55.9 49.4 33.7   7.6   5.7 
Latvia 58.2 54.3 49.3 21.8 12.9 
Lithuania 60.1 58.5 56.8 26.4 16.5 
Poland 55.1 49.3 37.7 20.9 18.6 
Slowakia 56.3 51.1 34.5   6.1 19.7 
Slovenia 62.7 58.5 29.0 15.1   5.9 
EU-15 64.0 54.9 51.9 22.6   7.4 
Source: Europese Commissie, The Social Situation in the European Union, Brussel 2003, pp. 203. No 
data for Malta   
 
The new member states still have a relatively young population compared to the old member 
states. However, mainly as a result of rapidly falling birth rates, population aging in these 
countries will be strong, and consequently, age dependency ratios will convergence to those 
in old member states. Combined with the high system dependency ratio as a result of the low 
effective retirement age, this could result in an explosion of pension costs. For example, 
without reform, pension expenditure in Poland would rise to more than a quarter of national 
income in 2050 (Lindeman et al. 2000). Against this background new member states - with 
Poland and Hungary in the forefront - are reforming their pension systems through a 
combination of de-indexing first pillar pensions, raising mandatory retirement age, and 
introducing second pillar supplementary pension funds. Some authors (e.g. Vaughan-
Whitehead 2003) consider these reforms as a form of 'social dumping'. However, as is 
evident from the description of the pre-reform situation, pensions reforms have been 
primarily enacted to ensure the sustainability of the pension systems and in stabilizing 
pension contributions. 
 
Do low expenditure ratios imply lower tax-wedges? 
Low employment ratios in new member states imply a narrow basis for financing social 
expenditure. As a consequence, tax wedges (the part of gross labour costs which consists of 
social security contributions and income taxes) are comparable to the average of the EU-15, 
despite the on average lower expenditure ratios (see table 5). This applies not only to 'high' 
spenders like Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, but also to 'low' spenders like the Baltic states 
(see for the latter OECD 2003).     
 
Table 5 Tax wedge 1999  
Poland 42.9 
Hungary 52.6 
Czech Republic 43.0 
Slovak Republic 42.0 
Slovenia 41.0 
Estonia 40.0 
Lithuania 39.7 
Latvia 41.7 
EU-15 weighted average 43.2 
EU-max (Belgium) 55.6 
EU-min (Ireland) 43.2 
Adapted from Ederveen and Thissen (2004), p. 33. Source:Eurostat. 
Tax wedge is employees’ and employers’ social security contributions and personal income tax less 
transfer payments as percentage of gross labour costs.  
 
As table 5 shows, Hungary in particular has a very high tax wedge. Because a high tax wedge 
could discourage new entrants on the labour market and encourage the growth of the informal 
sector, a vicious circle could emerge in which a high tax wedge causes falling official 
employment ratios, leading to still higher tax wedges etc (compare Ederveen en Thissen 
2004; European Commission 2003; United Nations 2004).    
 
Is social expenditure too low in new member states? 
We have given several reasons why one should be careful from drawing conclusion from the 
fact that social expenditure ratios in new member states are on average lower than in old 
member states: 
- There are considerable differences within the group of new member states; 
- Social expenditure in new member states are on average in line with their income levels, 
and in certain countries even well above this. 
- Mainly as a result of low employment rates, related to a low retirement age, the base for 
financing social expenditure is narrow, resulting in relatively high tax wedges.    
 
Consequently, we do not believe that lower social protection in new member states will put 
pressure on social protection in old member states. Anyway, such a scenario is unlikely given 
the fact that new member states are in economic terms very small compared to old member 
states. We expect that social expenditure in new member states will converge to the levels in 
old member states as a result from demographic developments and rising income growth. 
We observe that new member states mainly use lower company tax rates as instruments in 
locational competition. Although agglomeration rents will to a certain degree protect old 
member states’ higher company tax rates (Baldwin and Krugman 2002), it cannot be ruled 
out that this will put pressure on lowering company tax rates and through this channel also 
puts pressure on social protection expenditure (Tanzi 2000). However, this points to the need 
of minimum company tax rates instead of minimum social protection levels.    
 
It could also be argued that new member states will reduce social spending in order to fulfill 
the entry-criteria for the third phase of EMU. The budgetary criteria for entry in the euro-
zone have been criticized in the past as being overly stringent, forcing governments to cut 
social expenditure. However, judging by the experience of the current members of the euro-
zone, there is no evidence that budgetary consolidation in the 1990s, motivated by the will to 
fulfill the ‘Maastricht’-criteria on debts and deficits, has resulted in substantial cuts in social 
expenditure. As table 1 shows, social expenditures ratios in fact increased in the 1990s, even 
in countries like Italy, which started with a very high government deficit. The reason for this 
is that most countries used mainly (temporary) tax increases and proceeds from privatizations 
to consolidate their budgets (see Fatás et. al. 2003, pp. 35-37). Moreover, once financial 
markets started to believe member states would join the euro, risk-premiums on interest rates 
came down very rapidly, leading to huge savings on interest expenditure on the public debt. 
Related to this, we do not believe that sound-public finance policies will necessarily hurt 
social policy expenditure. Quite the contrary, by cutting-back interest-rate expenditure, a low 
debt policy might contribute to the sustainability of social protection systems in the long-run.       
 
Social security tourism from new member states? 
The other channel through which enlargement could put pressure on social security systems 
in old member states is migration (see section 2). More specifically, higher benefits in old 
member states could stimulate social security tourism, which could force old member state to 
lower benefits. However, we do not think this scenario to be very likely. We do not observe 
social security tourism within old member states, despite obvious differences between levels 
of benefits between southern and northern member states. A reason for this may be that EU-
citizens do not have an unconditional right to social assistance, unemployment benefits, or 
mandatory health insurance in other member states. The right of residence for non-workers is 
usually conditioned on the ability to be self-supporting and on not being a burden on the 
social security system in the host member state. Sinn (2003) argues that the Constitution, as 
drafted by the European Convention, will empower citizens with an unconditional right to 
social welfare in other member states. He argues that this will encourage massive migration 
flows from east to west, and force old member states to lower social protection. However, in 
our opinion this arguments rests on a misconception of the Constitution, as this explicitly 
denies citizens new rights (Van Riel 2003; Geelhoed 2003). Also the case law of the Court of 
Justice on the concept of European citizenship does not forbid member states to put certain 
limits to the access to their social protection systems in order to prevent social security 
tourism
5
. According to some authors (e.g. Bertola et al. 2001) these limits hinder the 
emergence of a truly European labour market as it restricts the mobility of the unemployed. 
Therefore harmonization of social minimum standards would be needed. However, this 
efficiency argument for social harmonization also fails to convince us for two reasons. 
Firstly, it has not been established that restriction of the right of residence of unemployed is 
an important reason for their low mobility. Other important factors are cultural differences 
and mobility costs. In addition, the unemployed are not very mobile within their own member 
state. Secondly, the argument fails the proportionally test. Do we really need harmonization 
of social minimum standards for making job search in other member states possible?       
 
CONCLUSIONS              
 
This article deals with the question whether we need to speed up social convergence in the 
enlarged EU by setting common minimum standards for benefit levels. Do we need such a 
harmonization of social protection systems, perhaps because of an increased danger of a 
social race to the bottom? We analysed the social dumping hypothesis, both theoretically and 
empirically and conclude that the case for harmonization is not strong. There are no clear 
signs of a social race to the bottom. On the contrary, several indicators show that during the 
past decades protection levels have converged to higher averages. This process of social 
convergence has been induced by the economic integration process.  
The new member states have on average lower protection levels than the EU15 (although the 
differences are not that large), but we do not expect that this puts pressure on protection 
levels in the old member states. It is important for the new member states to keep their labour 
costs low to be able to compete on the internal market. Once economic catching-up has been 
materialised, these countries will be able to develop a more mature social protection system. 
Premature social harmonization would be detrimental to the economic convergence process. 
Welfare states could also be threatened by increased migration flows. However, this threat is 
often exaggerated in our opinion. Citizens do not have unconditional rights to social benefits 
in other countries and other factors, such as cultural differences and mobility costs, also 
prevent massive ‘social tourism’. In any case, harmonization would not be the answer to this 
problem either. 
Although we conclude that the EU does not need harmonization of social benefit levels, we 
do acknowledge the importance of the social dimension of the EU in a more broad sense, 
both because of political reasons (the legitimacy of the integration process) and because of 
economic reasons. Member states are faced with the common challenge to increase the 
sustainability of their social protection system, which is under threat from various 
developments, especially from the ageing populations. The method of open coordination can 
help to realize these reforms. From an economic point of view, (some) economies of scale 
can be a ground for this coordination. Best practices and policy learning can be disseminated, 
while peer pressure and peer review can strengthen the commitment of member states to 
common (or own) objectives. However, until now the open coordination is not yet very 
effective. The essential problem is that the feed back to national policy making and thus the 
implementation is insufficient. We suggest a much stronger integration of the action 
programs, based on common EU-objectives and guidelines, in the national policy process. 
This also implies that national parliaments should pay greater attention to these programs and 
evaluate their implementation more systematically. A more effective coordination of social 
policy in the EU can contribute to the sustainability of the social protection systems of the 
member states and the modernisation of the European social model, which is an essential part 
of the Lisbon process. 
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Notes 
                                                     
1
 Leibfried and Pierson (1996:196) summarize the key implications of Regulation 1408/71 and its case law as 
follows. First, a member state may no longer limit social benefits to its citizens. Second, a member state may no 
longer insists that its benefits only apply to its territory and thus are only consumed there. Third, a member state 
is no longer entirely free to prevent other social policy regimes from directly competing with the regime it has 
built on its own territory (e.g. in the case of posted workers). Fourth, member states do no longer have an 
exclusive right to administer claims to welfare benefits.  
2
 A  property of the standard deviation is that its value rises with the average value of the data set to which it is 
applied. The coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation devided by the average value.  
3
 The calculation of net replacement rates differ in several ways compared to the calculation of gross 
replacement rates (see OECD 2002). Taxes and social security contributions on earnings and on benefits are 
taken into account. Moreover, net replacement rates do capture the effect of family-related benefits for children. 
Also housing benefits are included in net replacement rates. 
4
 Without new member states the trend line is (y is expenditure ratio, x = gdp per capita): y = 0,11*x +16 (R
2 
= 
0,30). Including new member states improves the fit: y = 0,13 *x+14 (R
2 
= 0,65). 
5
 See for example the conclusion of advocate-general Geelhoed in the Trojani case (C-546/02). 
 
 
 
 
 
